CVE-2026-99796
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel() until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held. A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s, 0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup watchdog fires: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100] RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0 io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170 io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0 __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110 Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket. __io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled. A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead of stopping at the match.
Executive briefing
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Evidence confidence: Not assessed Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict
Severity & attack characteristics
CVSS vector:
No CVSS vector is currently available in the source record.
Technical explanation & impact
Technical root-cause details are not available in the current source record.
Assess the impact using the published CVSS metrics and the affected vendor component.
Affected products and versions
NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.
Remediation & validation
- Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
- Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
- Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
- Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.
No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.
Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5310b477e619209b0cceb00b71ebc05a3e89360b REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9073da4d5bd87c71235d909512c478e8a13a5818 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9eff9c07e927dcd9c57150cd6fb3d4ec76f00480 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e409e1b03059c544d271c7f8e1215c5c0c62f278 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67