Evidence-led vulnerability intelligence · 2026-11-19 20:48 IST

CVE-2026-99558

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key() Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the following flow: dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback ?? blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0 ?? blk_crypto_start_using_key() ? ?? hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP ? ? # profile never allocated (NULL) ? ?? raw key: fallback_start_using_mode() ? ?? blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails ? ?? kfree(profile) # not NULLed ?? goto bad ?? inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set ?? blk_crypto_evict_key() ?? blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false ?? blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() ?? __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile) ?? profile->num_slots # BOOM!!! This issue can be reproduced using the following commands: dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64 LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing) SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP) KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n') dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \ $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped" And the following oops is triggered: ================================================================== blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0 Call Trace: blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320 inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160 inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0 dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40 table_load+0x1c4/0x490 ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20 ================================================================== dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it. Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable. The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto: dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.

UNRATED · N/ALinux

Executive briefing

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Assessment: Potential exposure only — validate product, version, configuration and vendor applicability.

Evidence confidence: Not assessed Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict

Severity & attack characteristics

N/A / 10 ·

CVSS vector:

No CVSS vector is currently available in the source record.

Technical explanation & impact

Technical root-cause details are not available in the current source record.

Assess the impact using the published CVSS metrics and the affected vendor component.

Affected products and versions

NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.

Remediation & validation

  1. Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
  2. Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
  3. Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
  4. Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.

No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.

Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references

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