CVE-2026-98166
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under "if (!ret)", so the ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink() infinite LRU walk on backup failure") tests "lret > 0", which is what was intended here as well. Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable. When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move (ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()), ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos->first / pos->last is left pointing at freed memory. The next ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(), "list_del corruption" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a hibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel Ainsworth's analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the dangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it dangles. Testing the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD Phoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on a 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one hibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the removal happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles were clean.
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Severity & attack characteristics
CVSS vector:Not supplied
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Technical explanation & impact
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Affected products and versions
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Remediation & validation
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Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references
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