Evidence-led vulnerability intelligence · 2026-09-12 01:49 IST

CVE-2026-89551

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow xdr_buf_trim() trims `len` bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp: fix_len: buf->len -= (len - trim); When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state: buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately consume far more bytes than buf->len records. The wrapped buf->len then propagates as the authoritative stream bound into every downstream XDR decoder. Fix by clamping the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero: buf->len -= min_t(unsigned int, buf->len, len - trim); On the normal path where the iov_lens sum to buf->len, (len - trim) is always <= buf->len and the result is identical to before. No callers change behavior outside the underflow case.

CRITICAL · 9.8Linux

Executive briefing

The source record describes: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow xdr_buf_trim() trims `len` bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp: fix_len: buf->len -= (len - trim); When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state: buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately consume far more bytes than buf->len records. The wrapped buf->len then propagates as the authoritative stream bound into every downstream XDR decoder. Fix by clamping the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero: buf->len -= min_t(unsigned int, buf->len, len - trim); On the normal path where the iov_lens sum to buf->len, (len - trim) is always <= buf->len and the result is identical to before. No callers change behavior outside the underflow case. The practical risk depends on whether an affected product/version is present, reachable and configured in an exploitable way. Review the affected-product evidence and linked vendor advisories before assigning exposure status.

Assessment: Potential exposure only — validate the installed product, exact version, configuration and vendor applicability before treating an asset as confirmed vulnerable.

Evidence confidence: Limited Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict

Severity & attack characteristics

9.8 / 10 · 3.1

CVSS vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vectorN
Attack complexityL
Privileges requiredN
User interactionN
ScopeU
Confidentiality impactH
Integrity impactH
Availability impactH

Technical explanation & impact

The technical mechanism is not expanded beyond the source description unless a referenced advisory supplies additional evidence. Read the linked vendor/CERT advisories for root-cause detail.

Potential impact must be interpreted from the published CVSS impact metrics and the affected component. A CVSS impact score is not proof that a particular asset is exploitable.

Affected products and versions

NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.

Remediation & validation

  1. Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
  2. Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
  3. Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
  4. Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.

No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.

Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references

Information gaps & confidence notes

These gaps indicate missing source data. CVE Watch does not fill them with guessed product, exploit or patch details.

Last enrichment: 2026-11-09T17:27:13+00:00 · Source last modified: 2026-10-19T09:17:50.393

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Threat intelligence, made actionable · CVE data sourced from the NVD