Evidence-led vulnerability intelligence · 2026-09-04 21:48 IST

CVE-2026-80841

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: defer vmalloc TX_RING free until skbs finish AF_PACKET TX_RING skbs keep a raw pointer to their ring frame. The skb page references preserve page-backed ring blocks after pg_vec is freed, but they do not preserve a vmalloc mapping. tpacket_destruct_skb() currently drops the pending reference before writing the timestamp and TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE to the frame. Move the decrement after those stores. The smp_wmb() in __packet_set_status() orders the frame stores before the decrement. Also recheck pending TX frames under pg_vec_lock before non-closing ring replacement, so a racing send cannot add a pending skb between the initial check and the ring swap. Ring allocation can produce a mixture of page-backed and vmalloc-backed blocks. Allocate deferred-work storage during TX ring setup when the first vmalloc-backed block is encountered, and keep its pointer in the pg_vec allocation header. If allocation fails, return -ENOMEM from ring setup. On socket close, a non-NULL pointer identifies a vmalloc-backed vector without a scan. If TX skbs remain, defer the whole vector to system_long_wq. After pg_vec is detached, a late destructor can skip the pending decrement. Use socket write-memory accounting as the deferred lifetime gate instead: an skb remains charged through its final sock_wfree(), after all ring-frame accesses. The delayed work retains a socket reference and reschedules itself until no TX skbs remain. Move pending_refcnt release to packet_sock_destruct() so late skb destructors and deferred cleanup can safely use it after packet_release(). Page-backed teardown remains synchronous, and no lock is added to the TX completion hot path.

UNRATED · N/ALinux

Executive briefing

A structured intelligence assessment has not yet been generated. The source description is shown above. The background enrichment worker will retry this record.

Assessment: Potential exposure only — validate product, version, configuration and vendor applicability.

Evidence confidence: Not assessed Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict

Severity & attack characteristics

N/A / 10 · CVSS

CVSS vector:
Not supplied

No CVSS vector is currently available in the source record.

Technical explanation & impact

Technical root-cause details are not available in the current source record.

Assess the impact using the published CVSS metrics and the affected vendor component.

Affected products and versions

NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.

Remediation & validation

  1. Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
  2. Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
  3. Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
  4. Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.

No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.

Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references

No external references are currently supplied in the CVE record.

Open NVD record ← Back to CVE Watch