CVE-2026-72381

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free of fp->owner.name in durable handle owner check Two concurrent SMB2 durable reconnects (DH2C/DHnC) on the same persistent_id race the fp->owner.name compare-read in ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner() against the kfree() in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd()'s reopen-success path. fp->owner.name is a standalone kstrdup() buffer whose lifetime is independent of the fp refcount, and the two sites share no lock: the compare reads the buffer while the reopen frees it, so the strcmp() can dereference freed memory. Commit 7ce4fc40018d ("ksmbd: fix durable reconnect double-bind race in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd") made the fp->conn claim atomic under global_ft.lock (closing the owner.name double-free and the ksmbd_file write-UAF), but the compare-read versus reopen-free pair was left unserialized. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strcmp+0x2c/0x80 Read of size 1 by task kworker strcmp ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner smb2_check_durable_oplock smb2_open Freed by task kworker: kfree ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd smb2_open Allocated by task kworker: kstrdup session_fd_check smb2_session_logoff The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 Serialize both sides of the race with fp->f_lock. The global durable file-table lock still protects the durable reconnect claim, but fp->owner.name is per-open state and does not need to block unrelated durable table lookups or reconnects. The teardown is left at its existing location after the reopen-success point so that an __open_id() rollback still retains owner.name for a later legitimate reconnect to verify.