Evidence-led vulnerability intelligence · 2026-08-10 18:50 IST

CVE-2026-68278

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation drm_dp_sideband_append_payload() has three related bugs when processing device-provided sideband reply data: 1. Zero-length curchunk_len underflow: msg_len is a 6-bit field taken directly from the DP sideband header. If a device sends msg_len=0, curchunk_len is set to zero. The condition (curchunk_idx >= curchunk_len) is immediately true, and curchunk_len-1 wraps to 255 (u8 underflow). drm_dp_msg_data_crc4() reads 255 bytes from chunk[48], then memcpy() writes 255 bytes into msg[], both far out of bounds. 2. chunk[48] overflow: curchunk_len can reach 63 (6-bit field). chunk[] is only 48 bytes. Multi-iteration payload assembly appends 16-byte blocks until curchunk_idx reaches curchunk_len, writing up to 15 bytes past the end of chunk[] into msg[]. 3. msg[256] overflow: each chunk contributes (curchunk_len-1) bytes to msg[]. No check ensures curlen + (curchunk_len-1) stays within msg[256], so the memcpy can spill into adjacent struct fields. All three are reachable from any DP MST device that can forge sideband reply messages on a physical connection.

UNRATED · N/ALinux

Executive briefing

The source record describes: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation drm_dp_sideband_append_payload() has three related bugs when processing device-provided sideband reply data: 1. Zero-length curchunk_len underflow: msg_len is a 6-bit field taken directly from the DP sideband header. If a device sends msg_len=0, curchunk_len is set to zero. The condition (curchunk_idx >= curchunk_len) is immediately true, and curchunk_len-1 wraps to 255 (u8 underflow). drm_dp_msg_data_crc4() reads 255 bytes from chunk[48], then memcpy() writes 255 bytes into msg[], both far out of bounds. 2. chunk[48] overflow: curchunk_len can reach 63 (6-bit field). chunk[] is only 48 bytes. Multi-iteration payload assembly appends 16-byte blocks until curchunk_idx reaches curchunk_len, writing up to 15 bytes past the end of chunk[] into msg[]. 3. msg[256] overflow: each chunk contributes (curchunk_len-1) bytes to msg[]. No check ensures curlen + (curchunk_len-1) stays within msg[256], so the memcpy can spill into adjacent struct fields. All three are reachable from any DP MST device that can forge sideband reply messages on a physical connection. The practical risk depends on whether an affected product/version is present, reachable and configured in an exploitable way. Review the affected-product evidence and linked vendor advisories before assigning exposure status.

Assessment: Potential exposure only — validate the installed product, exact version, configuration and vendor applicability before treating an asset as confirmed vulnerable.

Evidence confidence: Low Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict

Severity & attack characteristics

N/A / 10 ·

CVSS vector:

No CVSS vector is currently available in the source record.

Technical explanation & impact

The technical mechanism is not expanded beyond the source description unless a referenced advisory supplies additional evidence. Read the linked vendor/CERT advisories for root-cause detail.

Potential impact must be interpreted from the published CVSS impact metrics and the affected component. A CVSS impact score is not proof that a particular asset is exploitable.

Affected products and versions

NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.

Remediation & validation

  1. Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
  2. Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
  3. Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
  4. Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.

No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.

Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references

Information gaps & confidence notes

These gaps indicate missing source data. CVE Watch does not fill them with guessed product, exploit or patch details.

Last enrichment: 2026-11-07T16:31:32+00:00 · Source last modified: 2026-11-06T17:19:27.677

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Threat intelligence, made actionable · CVE data sourced from the NVD