CVE-2026-64523
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.
Executive briefing
The source record describes: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch. The practical risk depends on whether an affected product/version is present, reachable and configured in an exploitable way. Review the affected-product evidence and linked vendor advisories before assigning exposure status.
Evidence confidence: Low Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict
Severity & attack characteristics
CVSS vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Technical explanation & impact
The technical mechanism is not expanded beyond the source description unless a referenced advisory supplies additional evidence. Read the linked vendor/CERT advisories for root-cause detail.
Potential impact must be interpreted from the published CVSS impact metrics and the affected component. A CVSS impact score is not proof that a particular asset is exploitable.
Weakness classification
CWE-416Affected products and versions
NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.
Remediation & validation
- Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
- Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
- Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
- Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.
No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.
Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09dba37eee70d0596e26645015f1aa95a9848e9d REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16eaba5aa89c04eea125905bb8f988c1897f4f29 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22e371a93563c30ebebc576db049785e0d7fc617 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/685b10dd0e32c7782cead16c8cf055c609678583 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b913801ad9b9a51437d84d030ec6843e08976bd6 REFERENCE 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Information gaps & confidence notes
These gaps indicate missing source data. CVE Watch does not fill them with guessed product, exploit or patch details.
- NVD does not currently provide machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this record.
- No vendor advisory or patch reference was identified in the supplied CVE references.
Last enrichment: 2026-11-04T19:34:29+00:00 · Source last modified: 2026-11-03T18:15:39.353