Evidence-led vulnerability intelligence · 2026-07-25 15:47 IST

CVE-2026-64458

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/ops-common: handle extreme intervals in damon_hot_score() Fix three issues in damon_hot_score() that comes from wrong handling of extreme (zero or too high) monitoring intervals user setup. When the user sets sampling interval zero, damon_max_nr_accesses(), which is called from damon_hot_score(), causes a divide-by-zero. Needless to say, it is a problem. When the user sets the aggregation interval zero, the function returns zero. It is wrong, since the real maximum nr_acceses in the setup should be one. Worse yet, it can cause another divide-by-zero from its caller, damon_hot_score(), since it uses damon_max_nr_accesses() return value as a denominator. When the user sets the aggregation interval very high, damon_hot_score() could return a value out of [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] range. Since the return value is used as an index to the regions_score_histogram array, which is DAMOS_MAX_SCORE+1 size, it causes out of bounds array access. The issues can be relatively easily reproduced like below. The sysfs write permission is required, though. # ./damo start --damos_action lru_prio --damos_quota_space 100M \ --damos_quota_interval 1s # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0 # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/sample_us # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/aggr_us # echo commit > state # dmesg [...] [ 131.329762] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [ 131.336089] RIP: 0010:damon_hot_score+0x27/0xd0 [...] Fix the divide-by-zero intervals problems by explicitly handling the zero intervals in damon_max_nr_accesses(). Fix the out-of-bound array access by applying [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] bounds before returning from damon_hot_score(). The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko.

UNRATED · N/ALinux

Executive briefing

The source record describes: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/ops-common: handle extreme intervals in damon_hot_score() Fix three issues in damon_hot_score() that comes from wrong handling of extreme (zero or too high) monitoring intervals user setup. When the user sets sampling interval zero, damon_max_nr_accesses(), which is called from damon_hot_score(), causes a divide-by-zero. Needless to say, it is a problem. When the user sets the aggregation interval zero, the function returns zero. It is wrong, since the real maximum nr_acceses in the setup should be one. Worse yet, it can cause another divide-by-zero from its caller, damon_hot_score(), since it uses damon_max_nr_accesses() return value as a denominator. When the user sets the aggregation interval very high, damon_hot_score() could return a value out of [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] range. Since the return value is used as an index to the regions_score_histogram array, which is DAMOS_MAX_SCORE+1 size, it causes out of bounds array access. The issues can be relatively easily reproduced like below. The sysfs write permission is required, though. # ./damo start --damos_action lru_prio --damos_quota_space 100M \ --damos_quota_interval 1s # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0 # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/sample_us # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/aggr_us # echo commit > state # dmesg [...] [ 131.329762] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [ 131.336089] RIP: 0010:damon_hot_score+0x27/0xd0 [...] Fix the divide-by-zero intervals problems by explicitly handling the zero intervals in damon_max_nr_accesses(). Fix the out-of-bound array access by applying [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] bounds before returning from damon_hot_score(). The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. The practical risk depends on whether an affected product/version is present, reachable and configured in an exploitable way. Review the affected-product evidence and linked vendor advisories before assigning exposure status.

Assessment: Potential exposure only — validate the installed product, exact version, configuration and vendor applicability before treating an asset as confirmed vulnerable.

Evidence confidence: Low Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict

Severity & attack characteristics

N/A / 10 ·

CVSS vector:

No CVSS vector is currently available in the source record.

Technical explanation & impact

The technical mechanism is not expanded beyond the source description unless a referenced advisory supplies additional evidence. Read the linked vendor/CERT advisories for root-cause detail.

Potential impact must be interpreted from the published CVSS impact metrics and the affected component. A CVSS impact score is not proof that a particular asset is exploitable.

Affected products and versions

NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.

Remediation & validation

  1. Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
  2. Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
  3. Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
  4. Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.

No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.

Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references

Information gaps & confidence notes

These gaps indicate missing source data. CVE Watch does not fill them with guessed product, exploit or patch details.

Last enrichment: 2026-11-06T18:02:33+00:00 · Source last modified: 2026-11-06T17:18:55.090

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