Evidence-led vulnerability intelligence · 2026-06-25 14:46 IST

CVE-2026-53264

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a race with an associated action. Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER: 0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock 0: rcu_read_lock() 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR) 0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR 1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action 1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree(). Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu") but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu(). Let's illustrate the new restored code path: 0: rcu_read_lock() 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) 1: mutex_unlock() 1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0 1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR. CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace period, so no UAF can occur.

HIGH · 7.8Linux

Executive briefing

A structured intelligence assessment has not yet been generated. The source description is shown above. The background enrichment worker will retry this record.

Assessment: Potential exposure only — validate product, version, configuration and vendor applicability.

Evidence confidence: Not assessed Evidence-derived, not an exploitability verdict

Severity & attack characteristics

7.8 / 10 · CVSS

CVSS vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

No CVSS vector is currently available in the source record.

Technical explanation & impact

Technical root-cause details are not available in the current source record.

Assess the impact using the published CVSS metrics and the affected vendor component.

Affected products and versions

NVD has not supplied machine-readable vulnerable CPE product/version entries for this CVE. This is an information gap, not proof that no products are affected. Check the vendor advisory references below.

Remediation & validation

  1. Identify exposure by comparing the affected product and version ranges with your asset inventory, SBOM and externally exposed services.
  2. Review the linked vendor security advisory or patch notes. Upgrade to a vendor-confirmed fixed release; do not infer a fixed version from the CVE description.
  3. Until patched, consider restricting network access or disabling the affected feature where operationally safe. These are temporary controls, not a substitute for a vendor fix.
  4. Validate the remediation with a version check and vulnerability rescan, then retain change evidence.

No fixed version is displayed unless it is explicitly established by a vendor advisory. Follow the vendor's release notes for exact product and branch applicability.

Vendor advisories, patches & exploit references